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MAINE ELECTION LAW: DO MAINE’S PETITION SIGNATURE 
REQUIREMENTS DEPRIVE THIRD-PARTY CANDIDATES OF 
EQUAL PROTECTION AND FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 
RIGHTS? 
INTRODUCTION 
Ballot access laws in the United States have drawn scrutiny in recent 
years.1  All states in this country draft their own laws regarding ballot access 
for state and federal office.2  Allowing states to write their own ballot rules has 
become a contentious issue with some believing that discriminatory laws are 
being used to keep third party candidates from having a legitimate chance at 
gaining public office.3 
The United States maintains a two party, winner-take-all system that serves 
as a barrier to third party representation.4  The election system ensures that 
representation will be almost exclusively limited to either Republicans or 
Democrats, with independent candidates garnering seats only occasionally.5  
Additionally, the laws of some states impose additional obstacles, making 
elected office a nearly impossible accomplishment for third-party candidates.6 
One feature of this system is that many people will never vote for a third-
party candidate for fear that doing so would take votes from a more viable 
candidate.7  Indeed, claims persist that the 2000 Presidential election would 
have had a different outcome without third-party candidate Ralph Nader 
 
 1. See, e.g., RangeVoting.org, Ridiculous USA Ballot Access Laws Designed to 
Discriminate Against Third Parties, http://rangevoting.org/BallAccess.html (last visited Feb. 15, 
2010).   
 2. Id.   
 3. Id.; see also Richard Winger, Ballot Access Developments in 1994: Forward Steps 
Outweigh Slips, http://www.ballot-access.org/winger/fsos94.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2010) 
[hereinafter Ballot Access Developments]. 
 4. See Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1618 
(1999). 
 5. Richard Winger, The Importance of Ballot Access, LONG TERM VIEW (2004) available at 
http://www.ballot-access.org/winger/iba/html [hereinafter Importance of Ballot Access]; see 
RangeVoting.org, supra note 1; United States Senate, Senators of the 111th Congress, 
http://www.senate.gov/general/contact_information/senators_cfm.cfm (listing each United States 
Senator and his or her political party). 
 6. Importance of Ballot Access, supra note 5; RangeVoting.org, supra note 1. 
 7. Reneé Steinhagen, Giving New Jersey’s Minor Political Parties a Chance: Permitting 
Alternative Voting Systems in Local Elections, NEW JERSEY LAWYER, THE MAGAZINE, Aug. 
2008, at 15–16. 
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siphoning votes from Democratic candidate Vice President Al Gore.8  Be that 
as it may, the possibility that third-party candidates may detract votes from a 
major party candidate does not justify imposing separate election requirements. 
This Note deals with the issue of restrictive ballot access laws imposed on 
third party candidates in the State of Maine.9  The Maine Supreme Court has 
dealt with third-party candidates in national elections improperly.10  Maine has 
an interest in protecting the viability of its election process, yet cannot justify 
its requirements that eliminate a candidate’s right to ballot access.11  Further, 
this interest cannot be deemed compelling enough to disenfranchise people 
who otherwise would have voted for an independent candidate.12 
This Note argues that Maine’s ballot access requirements for third-party 
candidates violate the candidate’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Part 
I of this Note will discuss ballot access laws in general. The Note then 
addresses a state’s power in managing its own elections, as well as the issue of 
third-party candidates generally. The common understanding is that the 
Constitution allows latitude to states in holding elections without outside 
interference, though certain limitations may still be imposed on states.  Part II 
will then discuss the decision of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court in Knutson 
v. Department of Secretary of State & Herbert Hoffman.  Part III will examine 
the history behind contentious ballot access laws in light of the argument that 
such laws occasionally violate both the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  
Part IV will discuss the author’s analysis of the constitutionality of Maine 
ballot access laws in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s past jurisprudence. The 
Note concludes that Maine’s rigid requirements for candidates seeking a 
position on a federal election ballot violate a third-party candidate’s rights 
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution and that the 
decision of the Hoffman Court was incorrect. 
 
 8. See Carmen Mosley-Sims, Note, Ballot Access Restrictions in Representative 
Government: An Ode to the Wasted Vote, 26 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 703, 703 (2004). 
 9. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354 (2007); Virginia L. Woodell, Ogunquit’s Herb 
Hoffman: Candidate for U.S., THE YORK INDEPENDENT, March 7, 2008, http://www.york 
independent.net/news/2008/2008_03_07/080307_FTR_EC_og_senate. cfm. 
 10. See Emergency Application for a Stay of Enforcement of the Judgment of the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Maine Pending the Filing and Disposition of a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 
3, Herbert J. Hoffman v. John Knutson, 954 A.2d 1054, 1063 (Me. 2008) (arguing that Hoffman 
demonstrated “fair prospect (indeed a likelihood) . . . [of] prevail[ing] on the merits [of his 
claim]”) [hereinafter Knutson I]. 
 11. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354 (2007) (enumerating requirements for 
nomination petition); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983) (recognizing that some 
state regulation is necessary to an orderly election process);  Knutson v. Dep’t of Sec’y of State, 
2008 ME 129, ¶¶ 10–11 (same) [hereinafter Knutson II]. 
 12. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 783, 806; Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 18–
21. 
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I.  BALLOT ACCESS LAWS AND THIRD PARTY CANDIDATES 
A. Ballot Access Laws 
Ballot access laws are written and enforced by individual states, and as 
such, the laws of the various states differ with respect to independent party 
candidates’ ballot access.13  While some states make ballot access for major-
party candidates quite easy, this is rarely the case for independent-party 
candidates.14  Some have argued that of the world’s democracies, the United 
States has the most unfair laws with respect to ballot access.15 
Ballot laws affect third party congressional candidates differently than they 
do third-party Presidential candidates.16  While third-party Presidential 
candidates occasionally gain ballot spots, it is rare that independent candidates 
gain ballot spots in congressional races.17  As a result of stringent American 
ballot laws, it has been suggested that the United States is violating the 
Copenhagen Meeting Document, requiring countries to: “Respect the right of 
individuals to establish, in full freedom, their own political organizations and 
provide such political parties and organizations with the necessary legal 
guarantees to enable them to compete with each other on the basis of equal 
treatment before the law and the authorities.”18 
Attempts are being made to bridge the inequities existing between major 
and minor-party candidates.19  For example, Georgia has introduced legislation 
that would reduce signature requirements for independent candidates for the 
 
 13. Richard Winger, Ballot Access for Minor Candidates, BALLOT ACCESS NEWS (Ballot 
Access News, San Francisco, Cal.), 1992, available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/case/3pt/ 
winger.html.  
 14. Id.; see also RangeVoting.org, supra note 1.  
 15. See, e.g., RangeVoting.org, supra note 1.  For example, in Florida, “The ballot access 
laws for third parties and independent candidates have been very severe since 1931.  Since then 
only two third-party candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives and only one for the U.S. 
Senate have managed to get on the ballot.”  Id. (emphasis removed).  In addition, historic laws of 
various states also show the general direction that ballot access laws have taken over the years.  
Id.  In Minnesota in 1961, petitions had to be finished in two weeks.  Id.  In West Virginia, 
independent party candidates were required by law to inform people signing their petitions that if 
they signed the petition of a third-party candidate, the voter would not be permitted to vote in a 
primary.  Id.  To make matters worse, in West Virginia, the third-party candidate themselves 
would never actually know whether or not they had enough signatures to be placed on a ballot, 
because if anyone who signed the candidate’s petition was later found to have voted in a primary 
election, the voter’s signature would be invalidated.  Id. 
 16. Importance of Ballot Access, supra note 5. 
 17. Id.  As a result of this discrepancy between third-party Presidential and congressional 
candidates, and because independent Presidential candidates more frequently get ballot access, 
Winger says that the public may not believe that there is a problem for ballot access for 
independent candidates.  Id. 
 18. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 19. Id.  
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House of Representatives to 5000.  The law previously required 14,000.20  
Similar attempts have been made in Illinois, where proposed legislation would 
reduce the number of third-party signatures required by 11,000.21 
B. Third-Party Candidates 
A common perception in the United States is that third-party candidates are 
often unelectable.  Perhaps to ameliorate concerns that their ballot laws impose 
systemic burdens on third-party candidates, a number of states have taken a 
closer look at their ballot access laws for third party candidates, with some 
improvements being made since the early 1990s.22  Since the 1930s, third 
parties in the United States have rarely received enough votes for viable 
candidacies, despite the fact that many voters now identify themselves as 
unaffiliated with either of the major political parties.23  The plurality voting 
system has certainly played a role in the lack of viable third-party candidates 
since winning a percentage of the vote does not guarantee legislative 
representation.24  State ballot laws also reduce the viability of third party 
candidates by imposing additional restrictions or requirements.25  While it is 
possible for third party candidates to run successful campaigns, certain states 
have acknowledged the restrictive nature of their laws and have sought to 
amend them accordingly.26 
Concerns about Maine ballot access laws arose in the past year.  During 
the 2008 United States Senate race in Maine, Herbert Hoffman ran as an 
independent candidate for the Senate seat held by Senator Susan Collins.27  
Despite the fact that Hoffman believed that he had obtained the required 
number of petition signatures for his candidacy, Hoffman was left off the ballot 
due to a court ruling that a number of petition signatures were improperly 
obtained.28 
II.  THE HOFFMAN CASE 
Ballot-access laws in Maine for third-party political candidates are 
designed to protect the integrity of the political process and to ensure that 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. Importance of Ballot Access, supra note 5. 
 22. Ballot Access Developments, supra note 3. 
 23. Steinhagen, supra note 7, at 15–16. 
 24. See id. at 15 (noting that people prefer to vote for a candidate whom they perceive as 
electable). 
 25. Pildes, supra note 4, at 1617. 
 26. Id. at 1617–18 (noting that Jesse Ventura, who won the gubernatorial race in Minnesota, 
was able to win election as a third-party candidate); see also Winger, supra note 3 (describing 
changes to state election laws in 1994). 
 27. Woodell, supra note 9. 
 28. Knutson I, 954 A.2d 1054, 1057–62 (2008). 
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candidates go through proper measures to obtain ballot access.29  The specific 
language of Maine Revised Statutes tit. 21-A, § 354(7)(A) states: 
The circulator of a nomination petition shall verify by oath or affirmation 
before a notary public or other person authorized by law to administer oaths or 
affirmations that all of the signatures to the petition were made in the 
circulator’s presence and that to the best of the circulator’s knowledge and 
belief each signature is the signature of the person whose name it purports to 
be; each signature authorized under section 153-A was made by the authorized 
signer in the presence and at the direction of the voter; and each person is a 
resident of the electoral division named in the petition.30 
The plain language of the statute indicates that to validly obtain a petition 
signature from a voter, the candidate must be in the voter’s immediate presence 
while the petition is signed.31 
Herbert Hoffman ran for the United States Senate in Maine during the 
2008 election.32  The law in Maine required Hoffman, as a non-party 
candidate, to collect signatures on petitions that were to be presented to the 
Secretary of State.33  Hoffman did not obtain all of the signatures alone; about 
forty people assisted.34  By law, Hoffman—as well as those who were 
collecting signatures for him—needed to swear oaths as circulators.35  
Hoffman’s daughter, in addition to other circulators, also helped with obtaining 
signatures, specifically on election petitions that Hoffman had taken personal 
care to distribute, with Hoffman failing to observe some of the signatures, as 
was required by law.36  Despite the fact that Hoffman met the requirements 
regarding the number of signatures presented to the Secretary of State, the 
issue litigated in Hoffman was whether those signatures were lawfully and 
properly obtained.37 
The main issue concerning the signatures was whether Maine law required 
that the petitions be signed within the personal view of the petition circulator.38  
The Secretary of State determined that the law required the circulator of the 
petition to attest that the circulator was both physically present and aware of 
 
 29. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(7)(A) (2007); Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1061–62 
(holding that absence of fraudulent intent is not a defense to failure to comply with ballot access 
law). 
 30. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(7)(A) (2007). 
 31. See id. (imposing duty of knowledge on petition circulator). 
 32. Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1056–57. 
 33. Id. at 1057; see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(5)(C) (2007). 
 34. Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1057. 
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. at 1057–58.  
 37. Id. at 1057 (noting that over 4000 signatures were obtained by Hoffman for presentation 
to the Secretary). 
 38. Id.; see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(7)(A). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
680 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:675 
the signing when the third-party’s petition was signed.39  The circulator had to 
have sufficient physical proximity to witness the actual signing of the 
petition.40 
John Knutson, the Chairman of the Maine Democratic Party, contended 
that because Hoffman did not witness three of the signatures, he violated 
Maine election law.41 The issue becomes one of technicalities, because the 
allegation from Knutson was not that Hoffman was not near the petition when 
it was signed by a number of voters, but that because Hoffman did not see the 
signing of the petition, those signatures should be void.42  Knutson argued that 
under Maine law, not only should the three improperly obtained signatures be 
rendered void, but the entire petition on which the signatures appeared should 
also have been voided.43 
Both the trial court and the Secretary of State disagreed.44  The Secretary 
of State determined that of the 4112 signatures presented by Hoffman, seventy-
four ought to be invalidated, leaving Hoffman with enough signatures for a 
place on the ballot.45  Knutson challenged the decision of the Secretary of 
State, appealing to the Superior Court.46  The decision was appealed, as the 
court noted: 
pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80B and 21-A M.R.S. § 356(2)(D) (2007), urging the 
court to conclude that Hoffman’s oath was not in compliance with section 
354(7)(A) because Hoffman could not accurately aver that the three signatures 
had been provided in his presence as required by 21–A M.R.S. § 354(7)(A), 
and, therefore, that each of the three petitions must be declared void.47 
If the petitions were voided in their entirety, Hoffman would not have enough 
signatures for a place on the ballot.48 
Hoffman and the Secretary of State set forth three arguments on appeal.49  
The first argument by the Secretary of State alleged that to invalidate all of the 
signatures on the questioned petitions would be unconstitutional.50  If all of the 
 
 39. Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1059. 
 40. Id.  
 41. See id. at 1056 (presenting the questions raised by Knutson’s claims); Emergency 
Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 2. 
 42. Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 2.  
 43. Id.   
 44. Id.   
 45. Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1057 (noting that with the invalidation of seventy-four signatures, 
Hoffman would still have been left with 4038 signatures, which would still be enough for a place 
on the ballot). 
 46. Id. at 1057–58.  
 47. Id.; see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A § 356(2)(D) (2007). 
 48. Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1058. 
 49. Id. at 1061–62. 
 50. Id. at 1061.  
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petition signatures were void, the Secretary claimed, the freedom of 
association rights of the remaining voters would be infringed.51 
A second challenge, raised both by Hoffman and the Secretary of State, 
was that the only requirement of § 354(7) is that there be an honest oath, and 
though an oath may not have been accurately taken, as long as it was honestly 
taken, the oath should be upheld.52  The third claim by the Secretary of State 
was that petitions should only be invalidated in their entirety where the 
“defect” in the oath of the circulator was so great that it undermined the 
process of signature gathering.53 
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court addressed the three arguments raised 
by Hoffman and the Secretary of State.54  For the first argument, the court 
reasoned that because Maine jurisprudence allowed for the invalidation of the 
petitions in their entirety, the result was acceptable.55  The court came to this 
conclusion without any consideration of the constitutional issue that Hoffman 
raised.56  With regard to the second issue, the court rejected Hoffman’s 
rationale that as long as an honest oath was taken, it should be upheld.57  The 
court reasoned that the language of the statute itself did not allow for this type 
of interpretation and sought to impose the literal interpretation of the statute to 
safeguard the validity of the nomination process.58  Thus, while Hoffman 
argued that fraud should be required for the complete invalidation of a petition, 
and while the court acknowledged that fraud is a means by which a petition 
will be invalidated, fraud is not a precondition to invalidation.59  With regard to 
Hoffman’s final claim, the court was unmoved by the argument that the defect 
in the oath had to undermine the process of signature gathering; instead, the 
court retreated to the plain language of the statute, noting that the legislature 
could have opted to interpret the statute in a manner consistent with the desired 
interpretation of the Secretary.60  The court reasoned that although the 
Secretary’s policy rationale was not irrational, the legislature never intended to 
use such reasoning, and as such, the plain language of the law should be 
used.61 
When the Maine Supreme Judicial Court began its analysis, it first noted 
that the standard of review it would use when acting within its “appellate 
 
 51. Id.  
 52. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 354(7) (2007); Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1061. 
 53. Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1062. 
 54. Id. at 1061–62. 
 55. Id. at 1061. 
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. at 1061–62. 
 58. Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1061. 
 59. Id. at 1061–62. 
 60. Id. at 1062. 
 61. Id.   
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capacity” was “for findings not supported by the evidence, errors of law, or 
abuse of discretion.”62  The court looked to determine the intent of the 
legislature at the time that the legislation was written, looking first to the “plain 
language of the statute.”63  Should the language of the statute be deemed 
ambiguous, and the decision rendered by the Secretary of State reasonable, the 
court would defer to the interpretation of the Secretary of State.64 
The issue in this case was whether the Secretary’s interpretation of what 
constitutes being in the presence of a circulator of a petition was a reasonable 
interpretation of the statute.65  One of the turning points in the discussion 
regarded whether general “proximity” to the circulated petitions sufficed to be 
considered “in the circulator’s presence,” or whether a more direct physical 
presence was necessary.66  The Secretary of State recognized that if the 
circulator of the petition could not actually witness the signing of the petition, 
then the requirement that the signature be given in the circulator’s presence 
could not be met.67  Thus, the court recognized that the Secretary correctly 
determined that being in the circulator’s presence meant being “under direct 
observation of that circulator.”68 
The next issue was what remedy ought to be employed with regard to the 
improperly obtained signatures.69  The court reasoned that the oath Hoffman 
had taken alleging compliance with petitioning requirements was improper 
because some signatures had been obtained while Hoffman was not present.70  
While the court noted that three specific signatures had been collected 
improperly, Hoffman later admitted that: 
(1) there were times when he used the assistance of another person to collect 
the signatures for which he was the circulator; (2) his daughter used a separate 
clipboard to collect signatures when he was the circulator; (3) he thought that 
being within ten or fifteen feet of his non-circulator ‘assistant’ was acceptable; 
(4) another individual gathered a few signatures while he, Hoffman, was 
engaged in dealing with other responsibilities; and (5) he ‘might have’ left his 
daughter alone for a brief period to collect signatures while he was otherwise 
engaged.71 
 
 62. Id. at 1058 (citing Palesky v. Sec’y of State, 711 A.2d 129, 132 (Me. 1998). 
 63. Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1058. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 1058.  
 66. Id.   
 67. Id. at 1059. 
 68. Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1059. 
 69. Id. at 1059–60. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 1059. 
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As a result, the court concluded that it was not possible for Hoffman to have 
taken a legitimate oath.72  Because only three such instances of improper 
petition signing could be identified, however, the Secretary of State believed 
that only those three signatures could be invalidated.73  In prior hearings 
regarding petition circulation, the Secretary of State believed that the only time 
that a petition in its entirety ought to be thrown out is when the problem in the 
petition “undercuts the veracity of the oath as applied to the entire petition.”74 
But the Maine Supreme Judicial Court also looked at the plain language of 
the law regarding nominating petitions.75  Maine law provides that “[a] 
nomination petition which does not meet the requirements of this section is 
void.  If a voter or circulator fails to comply with this section in signing or 
printing the voter’s name and address, that voter’s name may not be counted, 
but the petition is otherwise valid.”76  Further, because the court reasoned that 
no requirement of fraud was necessary for the invalidation of a petition, it 
noted that the application of the law was straightforward.77  As such, the court 
held that unless an exception to Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A § 354(9) applied, 
the petitions had to be invalidated in their entirety.78  Neither of the parties to 
the action argued that the exceptions to § 354(9) applied under the 
circumstances.79 
During subsequent challenges by Hoffman in a Motion for Stay at the 
Maine Supreme Court, Hoffman argued that those voters who had legitimately 
signed his petition should not be deprived of their voting rights.80  The Maine 
Supreme Judicial Court concluded that prior holdings of the U.S. Supreme 
Court show that states have flexibility in ensuring the integrity of their 
elections.81  The Maine Supreme Judicial Court also reasoned that the petition 
 
 72. Id. at 1059–60. 
 73. Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1060. 
 74. Id. at 1060 (citation omitted).   
 75. Id.  
 76. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A § 354(9) (2007); see also Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1060 
(explaining that the language of the statute seems straightforward, and that the test is almost black 
and white in nature; if the requirements of the statute are met, the petition may be used, but if the 
requirements are not met, the petition must be voided). 
 77. Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1060. 
 78. Id. at 1060–61.  
 79. Id. at 1061.    
 80. Knutson v. Dep’t of Sec’y of State & Herbert Hoffman, Docket No. Ken-08-375, 2008 
WL 3855025, *2 (Me. 2008) [hereinafter Knutson III].  Hoffman argued that “his mistake should 
not affect the voters who signed his petition; specifically, he questions whether the application of 
section 354(7)(A) and (9), as first explicitly interpreted by ‘any court or agency on July 28, 
[2008],’ violates the First Amendment rights of Maine voters.”  Id.  (emphasis removed). 
 81. Id. (citing Buckley v. Am. Const. Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 191 (1999)).  
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requirements applied to all candidates, and that they did not affect any 
candidates differently than others—a point which is refutable.82 
In an Emergency Application for Stay to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
Hoffman analyzed the decision of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court in 
determining whether the decision of the court had been in error, and whether 
an emergency stay should be granted.83  Hoffman argued that the decision of 
the Maine Supreme Court subjected both voters in the State of Maine, as well 
as Hoffman himself, to “irreparable injury.”84  Hoffman reasoned that as a 
result of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court’s decision ridding Hoffman of 
approximately ninety signatures on three petitions, Maine voters would no 
longer have the opportunity to vote for the candidate of their choice in the 
general election in November 2008.85  Hoffman noted that the work of the 
Maine Supreme Court, as well as the evidentiary support in its decision, lacked 
sufficient merit in addressing the issue of First Amendment rights.86  
Specifically, Hoffman’s rationale was that the Secretary of State (the 
individual responsible for the enforcement of election law) believed that the 
invalidation of the petitions in their entirety would impose improper burdens 
on First Amendment rights,87 and that the decision of the Maine Supreme 
Court runs counter to recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions and other federal 
circuit decisions that have applied strict scrutiny under circumstances where 
election rights have been improperly burdened.88 
While Maine law required that the circulator of a petition have the petition 
signed in his or her presence, the definition of “presence” is not actually 
included within the statute itself, subjecting the law to interpretation.89  
Individuals who signed Hoffman’s petition while outside of his presence 
acknowledged that they were outside of Hoffman’s presence at the time they 
signed the petitions.90  The issue, however, is ambiguous, as the Maine 
Superior Court believed that the Secretary of State came to a reasonable 
conclusion when he determined that the requirements of Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
tit. 21-A § 354(9) showed that a petition did not need to be invalidated in its 
entirety simply because all signatures on the petition were improper.91  Of 
 
 82. Id. at *2–3.  
 83. Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 2. 
 84. Id.   
 85. Id. at 2–3. 
 86. Id. at 3 (“It decided the weighty First Amendment issues at stake with a few conclusory 
sentences, two case citations, and a declaration that it need ‘not address the constitutional concern 
further.’”).  See id. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 3. 
 89. Id. at 6–9; see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(7)(A) (2007); see also ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(9) (2007). 
 90. Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 7–8. 
 91. Id. at 9–10; see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(9) (2007). 
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course, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court did not agree with the decision, and 
believed that the petitions needed to be completely invalidated if an invalid 
signature was present.92  The Secretary of State asserted to the Maine Supreme 
Judicial Court that “[a] regulation that significantly burdens First Amendment 
rights must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be 
narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”93  Further, the Secretary of State 
reasoned that if the interpretation of the Maine Supreme Court was upheld, 
there was a serious risk that voters, who had been qualified to sign the petition 
and had done so, would have their rights seriously infringed.94  Specifically, 
the Secretary of State said: 
To require voiding of all of the voters’ signatures on a petition form based on a 
later finding that the oath was factually incorrect (or based on a 
misinterpretation of law) with regard to only one signature on that form, would 
deprive the voters who signed the petition of their rights to associate with, and 
vote for, the candidate in question.  In the absence of any evidence of fraud or 
misconduct on the part of the candidate or circulator, reading the statute this 
way imposes a draconian remedy that is not narrowly tailored to serving an 
important governmental interest.95 
The argument posed by the Secretary of State was that no sufficient 
government interest was being served, though the rights of voters to have their 
votes counted was being infringed upon.96 
Hoffman next asserted that, based on the foregoing arguments, his First 
Amendment rights would be violated insofar as he would not be allowed to 
appear on the November 2008 election ballot as a candidate for the Senate.97  
He argued that merely being able to appear as a write-in candidate would not 
be sufficient to remedy the violation.98  Further, the injury was immediate, and 
four years would pass before there was another Senate race in Maine.99 
With regard to voters, past decisions had addressed potential injury similar 
to that in the present case.100  Quoting the Supreme Court in Anderson v. 
Celebreeze, Hoffman argued, “The right to vote is ‘heavily burdened’ if that 
vote may be cast only for major-party candidates at a time when other parties 
or other candidates are ‘clamoring for a place on the ballot.’”101  Hoffman 
 
 92. Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 10–11. 
 93. Id. at 12. 
 94. Id.   
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 12–13. 
 97. Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 14; see also Fowler v. Adams, 400 
U.S. 1205, 1206 (1970). 
 98. Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 14–15.   
 99. Id. at 15; see also Campbell v. Bennett, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1347 (M.D. Ala. 2002).  
 100. Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 15. 
 101. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 787 (1982)). 
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continued his analysis by making note of the fact that in New England, the 
chances of having an independent candidate elected to the position of United 
States Senator are good.102  Hoffman said that the only realistic way for an 
independent candidate to be elected in Maine would be to ensure that 
Hoffman’s name was placed on the ballot.103  Further, Hoffman rationalized 
the importance of the right to vote, noting that prior cases have held “No right 
is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of 
those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live.”104  Any 
violation of First Amendment rights is unacceptable, and the injury in this case 
could not be remedied in any manner.105  “The loss of First Amendment 
freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes 
irreparable injury.”106 
The Supreme Court has held that the process of getting signatures for a 
petition constitutes protected speech.107  Specifically, the “Court has held that 
‘the solicitation of signatures for a petition involves protected speech since it 
‘involves both the expression of a desire for political change and a discussion 
of the merits of the proposed change.’”108  The circulation of petitions for 
elections constitutes political speech because it is an interaction between 
people looking to formulate “political change.”109  As such, Hoffman 
concluded that Maine election law, especially in the manner in which it was 
applied in the Hoffman case, constitutes an improper burden on the voters of 
Maine, as well as third party candidates who are seeking a place on the 
ballot.110 
III.  HISTORY 
A. Early Developments in Ballot Access Initiatives 
At the end of the nineteenth century, ballot access laws were not designed 
to infringe on the rights of potential political candidates.111  The general public 
did not believe that ballot laws were to act as a restrictive wall to a candidate 
 
 102. Id. at 15–16 (noting that recently, two Senators from New England states have been 
independents).   
 103. Id.  
 104. Id. at 16 (quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7 (1964)). 
 105. Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 16. 
 106. Id. (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). 
 107. Id. at 16–17. 
 108. Id. at 17 (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421–22 n.5 (1988)). 
 109. Id. (quoting Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 186 
(1999)). 
 110. Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 15–18. 
 111. Bradley A. Smith, Note, Judicial Protection of Ballet Access Rights: Third Parties Need 
Not Apply, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 167, 173 (1991). 
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or his or her party.112  During this era, two signatures on an election petition 
would have been enough for a potential candidate to have his name placed on a 
ballot.113  Today, American voters do not have the choices that prior 
generations did.114 
During the First World War, the laws began to change regarding ballot 
access.115  During the 1940s, ballot laws continued to take aim at minor-party 
candidates in light of the Communist scare that was disquieting the American 
psyche.116  This, in turn, increased the number of signatures required on 
petitions for nominating third-party candidates.117 
B. How States Restrict Ballot Access 
In the past, states developed a number of measures to restrict minor-party 
candidates from access to ballots.118  One manner in which candidates have 
been restricted from ballots is through the use of petition requirements, where a 
certain number of signatures need to be collected by a potential candidate 
before his or her name will appear on the ballot.119  All states, with the 
exception of Mississippi, have at some time or another required some sort of 
signature collection.120  The laws themselves impose requirements on third-
party candidates that are not usually imposed on major-party candidates.121  
Major parties often have perpetual places on ballots, which is something that 
minor-party candidates have not yet been granted.122  Only when a party 
obtains a certain percentage of the vote from a previous election will they be 
guaranteed a spot on subsequent ballots.123  For example, in 1891, under Ohio 
law, this meant that independent candidates were required to have their 
petitions signed by a minimum of one percent of the vote cast for governor 
during the last gubernatorial election.124  While obtaining the percentage is not 
a difficult task for major-party candidates, for a third-party candidate, this 
 
 112. Id. at 173 n.3. 
 113. Id.   
 114. Richard Winger, What are Ballots For?, LIBERTARIAN PARTY NEWS, 1988, 
http://www.ballot-access.org/winger/wabf.html. 
 115. Smith, supra note 111, at 173–74. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 174. 
 118. Id. at 174–75; Richard Winger, Ballot Format: Must Candidates be Treated Equally?, 45 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 87, 87, 100 (1997) [hereinafter Ballot Format]. 
 119. Smith, supra note 111, at 175. 
 120. Id.; see also Ballot Format, supra note 118, at 88 (noting that Ohio has required petitions 
for third-party candidates since 1891, though at that time, only 500 signatures were required to 
get on the election ballot). 
 121. Smith, supra note 111, at 174–76. 
 122. Id. at 175. 
 123. Id.  
 124. Ballot Format, supra note 118, at 88. 
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requirement is not often met.125  Though the issue of ballot access laws 
continues to be contentious, it has not merely developed within the past couple 
of years.126 
C. Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Ballot Access Laws 
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue of ballot access 
laws on many occasions, leading to conclusions that often served to protect the 
interests of third-party candidates.127  One of the foremost cases involving 
ballot access among third-party candidates was Williams v. Rhodes.128  In 
Williams, the Supreme Court examined whether the Ohio election statutes 
made it too difficult for third-party candidates to obtain a place on a general 
election ballot.129  The Socialist Party of Ohio challenged Ohio’s laws as 
unconstitutional.130  The Socialist party had been able to maintain a spot on 
Ohio’s election ballots up until 1948, when the party acknowledged that it 
would not be able to file a petition with the required number of signatures.131 
The panel that examined the case in 1948 noted that the Socialist Party 
would be allowed to have a write-in candidate on the ballot, though an actual 
place on the ballot would not be allocated to the party.132  By 1968, supporters 
of George Wallace had formed an independent political party in Ohio, and 
launched a campaign lasting six months so that the required number of 
signatures could be collected.133  Eventually, their party was able to collect 
over 450,000 signatures for its petition, which exceeded the 433,100 
required.134  There was never an issue that the party failed to obtain the 
requisite number of signatures for appearance on the ballot.135  Rather, the 
controversy surrounded the time allocated for filing.136  The party challenged 
the validity of such early filing deadlines, alleging that such requirements 
 
 125. Smith, supra note 111, at 175. 
 126. See id. at 174–78. 
 127. See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 784–86 (1983); Williams v. Rhodes, 
393 U.S. 23, 34 (1968). 
 128. 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (examining Ohio election statutes to determine whether the 
provisions makes it excessively difficult for third-party candidates to obtain a place on a general 
election ballot). 
 129. Id. at 31. 
 130. Id. at 26. 
 131. Id. at 26–27; see also Smith, supra note 111, at 178 (discussing the Ohio American 
Independent Party, the other party in the Williams case). 
 132. Williams, 393 U.S. at 28. 
 133. Smith, supra note 111, at 178; see also Williams, 393 U.S. at 26–27 (“The Ohio 
American Independent Party was formed in January 1968 by Ohio partisans of former Governor 
George C. Wallace of Alabama.”). 
 134. Williams, 393 U.S. at 26. 
 135. Id. at 27. 
 136. Id.; see also Smith, supra note 111, at 178. 
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served as a detriment to Ohio voters, and denied independent Ohio voters of 
equal protection rights.137 
The Supreme Court noted that Ohio was unable to dictate any compelling 
reason for imposing such enormous burdens on minor parties with respect to a 
citizen’s “right to vote and . . . to associate.”138  Ohio claimed that such 
stringent requirements on third parties promoted stability in the political 
system.139  But the Court believed that what Ohio was doing was promoting 
complete control of the political system within the Democratic and Republican 
parties.140  In addition, because third parties had to file at such an early date to 
obtain the necessary number of signatures to receive a place on the ballot, there 
were potential hindrances to a minor party’s ability to form quickly enough to 
meet the requirements that had been established by the state.141  As a result, the 
Supreme Court held that Ohio’s ballot access laws were unconstitutional due to 
their overly restrictive nature, and the Ohio American Independent Party was 
allowed to have a spot on the general election ballot.142 
1. Jenness v. Fortson 
Three years later, the Court had the opportunity to revisit its holding in 
Williams, responding to a challenge to Georgia’s ballot access laws.143  The 
Court’s first task was to determine what constituted a political party under 
Georgia law.144  Georgia law provided that a political party was “any political 
organization whose candidate received 20% or more of the vote at the most 
recent gubernatorial or presidential election.”145  All other political groups 
were “political bod[ies],” meaning that certain requirements would be imposed 
on that group if it wanted to have a place on a subsequent election ballot.146  
For political bodies, candidates seeking a spot on a general election ballot for 
the office of president or governor would be forced to acquire votes from five 
percent of the voting population that was otherwise “eligible to vote in the last 
election for the filling of the office he is seeking . . . .”147  Petitions could be 
 
 137. Williams, 393 U.S. at 27. 
 138. Id. at 31. 
 139. Id. at 31–32. 
 140. Id. at 32; see also Smith, supra note 111, at 179. 
 141. Williams, 393 U.S. at 33 (showing that by having such restrictive requirements, Ohio 
voters were deprived of a choice both regarding who they want to have in office, in addition to 
being denied the opportunity to have certain issues addressed).  
 142. Smith, supra note 111, at 180. 
 143. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 439–41 (1971). 
 144. Id. at 433. 
 145. Id. (noting a distinction between what constitutes a “political party” and what could be 
referred to as a “political body”). 
 146. Id.  
 147. Id. (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1010(b)); see also Amber J. Juffer, Note, Living in a 
Party World: Respecting the Role of Third Party and Independent Candidates in the Equal 
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circulated for 180 days, and the timing standards were identical to those 
provisions for primary candidates associated with political parties.148 
The challengers’ first argument with respect to the Georgia law was that a 
requirement that imposes an obligation on an independent candidate “to secure 
the signatures of a certain number of voters before his name may be printed on 
the ballot is to abridge the freedoms of speech and association guaranteed to 
that candidate and his supporters by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”149  
The second argument set forth by the challengers was that the nomination 
process for non-party candidates violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution insofar as there were different standards for the 
major-party candidates and the independent candidates.150 
The Supreme Court considered the case in light of its findings in Williams 
v. Rhodes.151  The Court noted that the statutory procedures present in Williams 
made it nearly impossible for minor political parties to receive a place on a 
general election ballot.152  The Court in Williams held that Ohio law imposed a 
large number of requirements on independent party candidates, forcing 
“extensive organization” that was not also required of major party 
candidates.153  As such, Justice Douglas believed that Ohio had restricted its 
candidates to Democrats and Republicans.154  The Court distinguished 
Williams from Jenness, noting that under Georgia law, those candidates who 
were unable to secure a place on the ballot could still launch a write-in 
campaign.155  Unlike the Ohio law at issue in Williams, Georgia law did not 
contain confusing and complicated rules for new parties.156  The Court’s 
decision in Jenness ultimately stood on the ground that “Georgia’s election 
laws, unlike Ohio’s, do not operate to freeze the political status quo.”157 
The problems that arose following Jenness included the Supreme Court’s 
difficulty in using a single standard of review when examining issues of equal 
protection among independent political candidates.158  The Court used multiple 
standards of review for equal protection, and would sometimes apply strict 
 
Protection Analysis of Ballot Access Cases, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 217, 222–23 (2007) (noting that 
the petition “had to be signed by five percent of the total number of the previous election’s 
eligible voters”). 
 148. Jenness, 403 U.S. at 433–44. 
 149. Id. at 434. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Jenness, 403 U.S. at 434–37 (examining Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968)). 
 152. Id. at 438. 
 153. Id. (quoting Williams, 393 U.S. at 27). 
 154. Id. at 436. 
 155. Id. at 438 (explaining that independent candidates were allowed to run a campaign, 
whereas under Ohio law write-in voting for independent candidates was not permitted). 
 156. Jenness, 403 U.S. at 438. 
 157. Id.; see also Juffer, supra note 147, at 222–23. 
 158. Juffer, supra note 147, at 222–24. 
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scrutiny, while other times it would apply intermediate scrutiny to evaluate 
whether a candidate had been denied equal protection rights.159  When the 
Supreme Court finally decided Anderson v. Celebrezze, a more objective basis 
was established for determining whether a state’s actions with regard to ballot 
access had violated the rights of an independent, non-party candidate.160 
2. Balancing Test of Anderson 
The Supreme Court’s analysis of Anderson v. Celebrezze established a 
balancing test to determine whether or not an individual’s right to placement 
on an election ballot had been violated.161  John Anderson initally ran for the 
office of President as a Republican, but later opted to run as an independent 
instead, realizing that he would be unlikely to defeat Ronald Reagan in the 
Republican primary.162  Anderson announced his candidacy as an independent 
candidate for President on April 24, 1980, and shortly after, his political 
supporters began to gather the signatures necessary to place him on the 
ballot.163  If Anderson filed the required number of signatures as well as the 
appropriate documents stating that he intended to run for President of the 
United States as a major party candidate, there would have been no problem 
getting a spot on the November ballot.164  As an independent candidate, 
however, Anderson was denied what would have otherwise been a certain spot 
in the general election.165  By the time Anderson officially announced his 
 
 159. Id. at 225–26 (“In Norman v. Reed, the Court added that a severe burden on an 
independent or third-party candidate triggers strict scrutiny.  However, the Court has been 
reluctant to find any burden that is severe enough to justify using strict scrutiny analysis.”). 
 160. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983). 
 161. Donald E. Daybell, Guarding the Treehouse: Are States “Qualified” to Restrict Ballot 
Access in Federal Elections?, 80 B.U. L. REV. 289, 309–10 (2000) (summarizing Anderson). 
 162. See also Anderson, 460 U.S. at 782, 788–89 (challenging an Ohio law under which 
major political party candidates and minor political-party candidates were distinguished when 
considering the timing of when they were forced to turn in petitions for a position in the general 
election); Daybell, supra note 161, at 308–09. 
 163. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 782 (noting that Anderson was seeking to have his name placed 
on the general election ballot for every state, in addition to having his name placed on the ballot 
in Washington, D.C.). 
 164. Id. at 782–83 (“These documents would have entitled Anderson to a place on the ballot 
if they had been filed before [the deadline].  Respondent refused to accept the petition solely 
because it had not been filed within the time required by § 3513.25.7 of the Ohio Revised 
Code.”).  
 165. Id. at 782–83.  Section 3513.25.7 of the Ohio Revised Code read:  
Each person desiring to become an independent candidate for an office for which 
candidates may be nominated at a primary election . . . shall file no later than four p.m. of 
the seventy-fifth day before the day of the primary election immediately preceding the 
general election at which such candidacy is to be voted for by the voters, a statement of 
candidacy and nominating petition as provided in section 3513.261 . . . of the Revised 
Code . . . .  
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candidacy as an independent, the deadline for filing under Ohio law for 
independent political candidates had already passed.166 
The District Court determined that there were two grounds for finding the 
Ohio law improper.167  First, the early filing deadline for independent party 
candidates was deemed unconstitutional because “[i]t imposed an 
impermissible burden on the First Amendment rights of Anderson and his Ohio 
supporters and diluted the potential value of votes that might be cast for him in 
other States.”168  Further, the District Court also noted that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was violated insofar as Ohio’s election laws mandated action on 
the part of non-party candidates, while not enforcing similar provisions against 
members seeking office who belonged to a political party.169  In addition, the 
District Court rejected the State of Ohio’s justifications for the law—
administrative convenience and “political stability”—because those interests 
were of “diminished importance in a Presidential campaign,” and because 
those concerns were adequately addressed by another Ohio statute.170 
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the early filing deadline for 
non-party candidates was important, allowing voters the opportunity to analyze 
their independent candidate choices.171  But Anderson challenged not only the 
filing provisions under Ohio law, he also wanted his name placed on the ballot 
in states like Maryland and Maine, where earlier filing deadlines were also 
used.172 
The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that it was concerned that 
heavy restrictions on voters’ rights would have an impact on the number of 
candidates that a prospective voter could choose from.173  The Court found that 
a number of freedoms were potentially infringed by the requirements of Ohio’s 
early filing date.174  The first was the general belief of voters that they will 
 
Id. at 783 n.1. 
 166. Id. at 782. 
 167. Id. at 783. 
 168. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 783; see also Daybell, supra note 161, at 309–11 (summarizing 
Anderson). 
 169. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 783.  
 170. Id. at 783–84. 
 171. Id. at 784–86. 
 172. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 786 (citing Anderson v. Quinn, 634 F.2d 616 (1st Cir. 1980); 
Anderson v. Morris, 636 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1980), each of which upheld district court decisions 
ordering Anderson’s name placed on the ballot);  see generally Anderson v. Morris, 500 F.Supp. 
1095 (Md. 1980) (noting that the order of the Maryland court was also for affirmance); see 
generally Anderson v. Quinn, 495 F.Supp. 730 (Me. 1980) (explaining that the order of 
affirmance was issued). 
 173. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 786 (explaining that the Court must look at how the voter is 
impacted by the laws). 
 174. Id. at 786–88. 
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have a candidate choice representing their own thoughts or values on issues.175  
The Court reasoned that if only major-party candidates made the ballot while 
third-party candidates were excluded, the rights of the voter would be 
burdened.176  Second, denying certain candidates a place on the ballot also has 
implications for the freedom of association rights of voters, and the Court 
noted that elections play an important role in allowing people with similar 
ideals and values to come together in support of a candidate for political 
office.177 
Generally, states were allowed to enact certain restrictions on political 
candidates when those restrictions were essential to the operation of elections, 
or where there were other reasons for imposing those restrictions.178  The 
Anderson Court stated that “as a practical matter, there must be a substantial 
regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of 
order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic process.”179  In 
determining whether a state’s actions were legitimate with regard to the 
restrictions imposed on non-party candidates, the Court established a balancing 
test.180  First, the Court needed to “consider the character and magnitude of the 
asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate.”181  Second, the Court needed to “identify 
and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for 
the burden imposed by its rule.”182  Finally, the Court had to “consider the 
extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s 
rights.”183  Once the Court considered those three factors, it could determine 
whether or not the challenged provision violated the constitution.184 
The Supreme Court noted that Ohio election law served as a serious 
detriment to the political process in Ohio because it required that independent 
 
 175. See id. at 787;  see also Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974). 
 176. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 787–88 (quoting Lubin, 415 U.S. at 716) (“The right to vote is 
‘heavily burdened’ if that vote may be cast only for major-party candidates at a time when other 
parties or other candidates are ‘clamoring for a place on the ballot.’”). 
 177. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 787–88. 
 178. Id. at 788; Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974).   
 179. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 (quoting Storer, 415 U.S. at 730). 
 180. Id. at 789; see also Daybell, supra note 161, at 310 (summarizing Anderson). 
 181. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789; see also Daybell, supra note 161, at 310 (summarizing 
Anderson). 
 182. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789; see also Ryan Nazzarine, A Faceless Name in the Crowd: 
Freedom of Association, Equal Protection, and Discriminatory Ballot Access Laws, 72 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 309, 319 (2003) (characterizing the Anderson Court’s holding as concluding “that the 
burden placed upon voters unquestionably outweighed the State’s interests”). 
 183. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789. 
 184. Id. 
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candidates file their petition forms at too early a date.185  While major parties 
had a long period of time and added flexibility in choosing their presidential 
nominees, independent candidates were compelled to decide whether they 
were going to run by March.186  The Ohio law was also deemed to hinder an 
independent party candidate’s ability to collect the required number of 
signatures.187  The Court ultimately held that the early deadline for filing 
imposed a heavy burden on Ohio’s “independent-minded voters.”188  The 
major question for the Court in determining the constitutionality of such 
provisions was whether “the availability of political opportunity” was “unfairly 
or unnecessarily burden[ed]” by the restrictions imposed by the state.189  The 
Court held that where a burden falls upon an independent candidate in a 
manner that is not equal to that of a major party candidate, association rights 
protected by the First Amendment are infringed.190 
3. The Battle over the Constitutionality of Term Constraints on Ballot 
Laws 
Term constraints have been looked at as an improper ballot restriction as 
well.191  When a candidate for office has been disqualified, the Court has 
sought to determine whether the decision can be upheld using the rationale that 
the candidate was unable to obtain a certain level of public support prior to the 
election.192  For instance, Arkansas law prohibited individuals who had already 
served three terms in the United States House of Representatives from running 
for that position again.193  When the law was challenged in U.S. Term Limits, 
Inc. v. Thornton, the Court identified two issues: first, “whether the 
Constitution forbids States to add to or alter the qualifications specifically 
 
 185. Id. at 790–91 (noting that independent candidates were forced to have their petitions 
filed in March; major party candidates often had not even been nominated by that time, nor would 
they be for a significant period). 
 186. Id. at 791 n.11 (“Indeed, because it takes time for an independent Presidential candidate 
and his supporters to gather the requisite 5,000 signatures on nominating petitions, the 
independent must decide to run well in advance of the March filing deadline.  In contrast, Ohio 
law provides for the automatic inclusion of the Presidential nominees of the major parties on the 
general election ballot, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.10 (Supp. 1982), even if they have never 
filed a statement of candidacy in Ohio.  Their identities are not established until after the major-
party conventions in August.”).   
 187. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 792 (stating that when the date for filing is imposed on such an 
early date as it pertains to independent candidates, it makes things more difficult for that 
candidate in terms of organizing his or her campaign; such difficulties includes finding 
volunteers, and finding people who are willing to contribute to an independent campaign).   
 188. Id.  
 189. Id. at 793 (quoting Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 964 (1982)). 
 190. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 793–94. 
 191. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 827 (1995). 
 192. Daybell, supra note 161, at 320. 
 193. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 784. 
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enumerated in the Constitution;”194 second, “if the Constitution does so forbid, 
whether the fact that Amendment 73 [the Arkansas law at issue] is formulated 
as a ballot access restriction rather than as an outright disqualification is of 
constitutional significance.”195  The Court noted that, despite the fact that 
candidates still had a right to pursue their candidacy through a write-in 
campaign, the State of Arkansas had acted in a manner contrary to the United 
States Constitution.196 
One issue in Thornton was that of public support, and whether a state’s 
decision to disqualify a candidate for office can stand if the candidate fails to 
show that he or she has obtained a certain level of public support prior to an 
election.197  The Court noted that the petitioners in an earlier case, Storer, 
unsuccessfully argued that the signature requirements placed on independent 
candidates imposed an additional qualification on running for office, violating 
the Qualifications Clause.198  The Thornton Court distinguished Storer with 
little explanation, stating only that Storer did not apply on the present facts.199 
4. First Amendment Protections 
The First Amendment plays an integral role in protecting the political 
process, and the Supreme Court has acknowledged the fundamental 
importance of the amendment’s protection in the political sphere.200  
Specifically, the First Amendment plays a fundamental role with regard to 
ballot access laws and ensures that strict scrutiny is used when addressing such 
issues.201  One of the major purposes of the First Amendment is to ensure that 
free discussion could be maintained among individuals speaking on the topic 
of “government affairs.”202  Perhaps more importantly, the First Amendment 
protects an individual’s right to associate politically, as acknowledged in 
NAACP v. Alabama, especially when controversial viewpoints are 
expressed.203 
 
 194. Id. at 787. 
 195. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 787. 
 196. Id. at 829 
 197. Id. at 828–29 (explaining that the signature requirements being imposed on independent 
candidates became a popular method of determining whether or not a candidate had public 
support prior to the holding of an election). 
 198. Id. at 828. 
 199. Id. 
 200. FREE EXPRESSION IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 172–73 (Sheila Suess 
Kennedy, ed.) (1999); DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 233 (2d. ed. Foundation 
Press 2003). 
 201. See FARBER, supra note 200, at 241. 
 202. FREE EXPRESSION, supra note 200, at 172–73. 
 203. Id. at 173 (noting that when political groups assemble, different vantage points are 
expressed); see FARBER, supra note 200 at 233. 
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The First Amendment protects a wide range of activity, including the right 
of groups to organize, though these rights are not unlimited.204  States are often 
allowed a fair amount of deference concerning ballot laws, despite the 
acknowledgment that the laws may impede political association.205  It has been 
argued, however, that freedom of association rights are at their pinnacle when 
the activity of a group deals with speech that is political in nature.206  A line 
exists between the right of a state to determine how elections ought to be 
controlled and the rights reserved to political organizations.207 
Courts have generally held that where there is serious infringement on 
ballot access, the appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied is strict, though 
reasonable infringements are entitled to a more deferential standard of 
review.208  Courts in the past, when using strict scrutiny, have overturned state 
laws that burden a party’s right to freely associate and to nominate one of its 
own candidates for office.209 If the restrictions imposed on the rights of the 
voter are reasonable, however, courts will often find that the state’s interest in 
regulating the election is a proper reason for the restrictions.210  In Burdick v. 
Takushi, the Supreme Court held a Hawaii law not allowing write-in votes for 
its elections was constitutional.211  However, Hawaii law allowed for a number 
of ways in which candidates were able to get on the election ballot, and thus, it 
was determined that not allowing write-in candidates a spot on the ballot was 
not a serious enough infringement to be unconstitutional.212 
The Supreme Court in Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party made clear 
that First Amendment protections for third-party candidates did not guarantee a 
plethora of rights.213  There, the Court noted that simply because it was more 
difficult for independent-party candidates to succeed in elections did not mean 
 
 204. FARBER, supra note 200, at 233.  “[T]he First Amendment would lose much of its value 
if it protected only isolated individuals but left the government a free hand to prevent organized 
activity.”  Id.  See also Recent Cases, Constitutional Law—Third Circuit Invalidates Statute 
Burdening Ballot Access on Equal Protection Grounds—Reform Party of Allegheny County v. 
Allegheny County Dep’t of Elections, 174 F.3d 305 (3d. Cir. 1999) (en banc), 113 HARV. L. REV. 
1045, 1045 (1999) (noting that courts recognize limits on the right to assembly) [hereinafter 
Recent Cases]. 
 205. Recent Cases, supra note 204, at 1045.   
 206. FARBER, supra note 200, at 233. 
 207. Id. at 239 (“The difficult problem is drawing a line between legitimate state efforts to 
structure the electoral process and illegitimate intrusion on the rights of the parties.”). 
 208. See id. at 239–41 (collecting cases demonstrating varying degrees of deference to state 
laws). 
 209. Recent Cases, supra note 204, at 1046 (discussing Reform Party of Allegheny County v. 
Allegheny County Dep’t of Elections, 174 F.3d 305 (3d. Cir. 1999)); see Reform Party of 
Allegheny County v. Allegheny County Dep’t of Elections, 174 F.3d 305 (3d. Cir. 1999).   
 210. FARBER, supra note 200, at 241. 
 211. Id.; see generally Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992). 
 212. FARBER, supra note 200, at 241. 
 213. Id.; see generally Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997). 
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that a state had to allow third-party candidates to enter into coalitions with 
major-party candidates.214  The Court upheld the ban, noting that ensuring 
voter clarity during the voting process served as sufficient rationale.215  Some 
believe that this ensures a degree of constitutional protections to third-party 
candidates, while at the same time, assuring that the two-party system remains 
present in American politics.216 
5. The Rights of States to Manage Their Elections 
States have almost complete authority to engage in election regulation, and 
courts have allowed states to ensure that certain interests, including the right of 
voters to be informed about the electoral process as well as political stability, 
are protected.217  Political parties themselves are lightly regulated, allowing 
parties to engage in most activities short of violating constitutional 
provisions.218  The Constitution allows states a great deal of latitude in holding 
their own elections with little outside interference, and states are entitled to 
regulate the “times, places, and manner of holding elections” for Congressional 
races, with the only check on the state related to Congress’s ability to look over 
the process.219 
In Anderson, the Court noted that states have a right to ensure that those 
voters who cast their ballots are informed about the electoral process.220  In 
addition, Anderson added a number of other interests that the state could 
consider.221  Aside from having educated voters, further interests included 
ensuring a stable political environment and requiring “equal treatment for 
partisan and independent candidates.”222 
With regard to voter education, the Court in Anderson noted that from the 
times of the Founding Fathers, there was a sentiment the President should not 
be voted for directly by the American populous.223  The Court stated that it was 
 
 214. FARBER, supra note 200, at 241. 
 215. Id. at 241–42. 
 216. See generally id. at 242. 
 217. Nathaniel Persily, Candidates v. Parties: The Constitutional Constraints on Primary 
Ballot Access Laws, 89 GEO. L.J. 2181, 2207 (2001); see Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 
796 (1983). 
 218. Persily, supra note 217, at 2207.  
 219. Id. at 2207–08. 
 220. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 796. 
 221. Id. at 796–97. 
 222. Id.; see Daybell, supra note 161, at 300–01 (noting that while the purpose behind the 
procedural rights given to the states to manage their own elections was so that states could 
determine how people would vote, this never entailed allowing states such a role in the process as 
to determine who was going to be elected). 
 223. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 797 n.21 (explaining that there was early apprehension of 
allowing the American people to directly elect the president, for fear that they were not intelligent 
enough to perform such a duty). 
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unclear whether the education of the voter continued to be a justifiable purpose 
behind the early filing date imposed on independent candidates in Ohio.224  
There were a number of reasons why voter education was no longer considered 
a justifiable reason for restrictive ballot laws according to the Anderson 
Court.225  In the first instance, by the time the Supreme Court heard Anderson, 
media had changed the manner in which people were able to receive 
information about candidates during elections.226  In addition, literacy was not 
a skill possessed by all during the 18th century, but this was no longer the case 
at the time of Anderson.227  Not only were Americans more literate, but the 
Court also acknowledged that Americans were better informed about their 
candidate choices for public office.228  Following the analysis in Anderson, the 
Supreme Court reasoned that pronouncements by a state claiming that its 
actions were performed in order to better educate its people should be looked 
upon with scrutiny.229 
The equal treatment of candidates was an additional interest of the Court in 
Anderson, and various steps were taken to ensure the equal treatment of major 
and minor-party candidates.230  The justification of Ohio in Anderson was that 
the election statutes of Ohio enabled “equal treatment” between major-party 
primary candidates and general election independent candidates.231  The Court 
found a major distinction between candidates competing in party primaries as 
opposed to candidates who were running in an election as an independent 
candidate.232  The Anderson Court recognized that regardless of who ended up 
running under the Democratic or Republican ticket during an election, the fact 
remained that a Democrat or Republican would still have a place on the 
ballot—a luxury not afforded to an independent who did not file an election 
petition in time.233  Further, while administrative purposes could be 
 
 224. Id. at 797. 
 225. See id. (noting that changes in era can also impact the manner in which the population 
considers their laws). 
 226. Id 
 227. Id.; see Cent. Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook North America: The United 
States, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html (explaining that 
of all individuals in the United States today age fifteen and above, the literacy rate is 
approximately ninety-nine percent) (last visited March 24, 2010). 
 228. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 796–97. 
 229. Id. at 798. 
 230. Id. at 799–801. 
 231. Id.  
 232. Id. at 799 (“The consequences of failing to meet the statutory deadline are entirely 
different for party primary participants and independents.”). 
 233. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 799.  It should also be noted that the Court in Anderson 
acknowledged the fact that write-in votes were permitted for independent candidates.  See id. at 
799 n.26.  The Court also noted, however, that such action could not serve as a substitute for a 
candidate actually having their name placed on a ballot.  Id. 
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established, requiring a major-party primary candidate to file seventy-five days 
prior to a primary, the same justification did not hold true for an independent 
candidate.234  Ballots needed to be prepared in an adequate amount of time, 
especially for a presidential race, where the nomination of the party candidate 
usually comes before the party’s convention.235  Similar justifications could not 
be made for independent candidates, and there was no compelling 
administrative purpose justifying why an independent candidate would be 
forced to submit their petitions at such an early date.236 
6. The State of Elections Today 
Legislation is a common approach used to limit the rights of independent 
candidates in obtaining ballot access.237  The petitioning system is one of the 
most popular tools that states use today with regard to allowing third-party 
candidates to receive a place on a general election ballot.238  The general rule is 
that if a political party had a candidate in a previous election who received a 
pre-set number of votes (or a percentage of the vote), the party would 
automatically be able to have another candidate put on the ballot in subsequent 
elections.239  Because this sort of success is rare among third-party candidates, 
states have requirements forcing independent candidates to obtain a certain 
number of signatures to ensure a place on the ballot.240 
Regardless of the number of signatures that are actually required of the 
candidates, some have argued that the fact that independent party candidates 
need to collect signatures at all is intended only as a mechanism to keep third-
party candidates off the ballot.  Many states continue to use strict 
requirements.241  As recently as 1994, Colorado maintained what amounted to 
a residency requirement for third-party candidates.242  In order for a third-party 
candidate to run for a congressional seat in Colorado, the candidate had to be 
registered as an independent for a year prior to any petition submitted for a 
spot on the general election ballot.243  As of 1994, no third-party candidate in 
 
 234. Id. at 800. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id.  No administrative purpose could be established regarding the early filing date set 
forth by Ohio.  Ohio did not prove, nor did it even set forth the notion that a March filing date 
was a necessity for the state to take care of such tasks as counting votes.   
 237. Smith, supra note 111, at 174–75. 
 238. Id. at 175 (noting that all states with the exception of Mississippi have some sort of 
petitioning system). 
 239. Id.  
 240. Id. at 176.  The number of signatures actually required by different states varies 
drastically, and during the 1990 election, New Jersey required as few as 200 signatures for a spot 
in the general election, whereas Florida required over 180,000.  See id. 
 241. Id. at 176; Winger, supra note 3. 
 242. Winger, supra note 3. 
 243. Id.   
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Georgia had been able to make the ballot while running for the United States 
House of Representatives due to the state’s strict petitioning requirements.244  
Illinois continues to have both stringent and disproportionate signature 
requirements as they relate to the major party and independent party 
candidates.245  For example, in Illinois, major party candidates for governor 
only need to obtain 5000 signatures for a place on the ballot.246  Independent 
candidates for governor need 25,000 signatures.247  The issue for this Note 
becomes whether the various impositions on individuals seeking a spot on an 
election ballot are too stringent, and whether the laws should be relaxed so that 
minor-party candidates have a greater chance of being able to run for elected 
office.248 
IV.  WHERE MAINE ELECTION LAW FALLS SHORT 
A number of Maine’s election laws pose an unnecessary burden to a third-
party candidate’s ability to have his or her name placed on general election 
ballots, and as such, should be declared a violation of both voter’s and 
candidate’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.249  While it can be argued 
that the petition requirements under Maine law may be applied equally to both 
major-party and independent-party candidates, the law simply does not 
mandate such equal application.250 
The provisions of Maine’s election law that precluded Herbert Hoffman 
from a spot on the ballot violate the Fourteenth Amendment because they 
impose a burden on third-party candidates, going beyond the protection that 
courts in the past have recognized as constituting permissible state interests.251  
Such an argument was raised by the challengers of a Georgia election law in 
 
 244. Id.  
 245. Freeandequal.org, Third Party Activists on Illinois HB 723: “The Protect Incumbents 
Act,” http://www.freeandequal.org/2009/08/third-party-activists-on-illinois-hb-723-the-protect-
incumbents-act/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2010).  
 246. Id.; see also Winger, supra note 3. 
 247. Third Party Activists, supra note 245; Winger, supra note 3. 
 248. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 26–27 (1968); see Knutson v. Dep’t of Sec’y of 
State and Herbert Hoffman, 954 A.2d 1054, 1057;  Winger, supra note 3. 
 249. U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV; Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 14–
18. 
 250. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(7)(A) (2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 
354(9); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 796–99 (1983) (acknowledging the difference in 
treatment between major and independent party candidates). 
 251. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(7)(A); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(9); 
Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788; Williams, 393 U.S. at 31; see Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1060–61. 
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Jenness, where the argument was that the signature requirements imposed an 
improper burden to freedom of association rights.252 
Independent candidates are placed under constraints that major-party 
candidates simply do not have to contend with.253  Such constraints weigh no 
differently on third-party candidates in Maine than in many other states.254  
Maine law draws distinctions between those candidates representing major 
political parties and those candidates running as independents, requiring a 
greater effort from third-party candidates for their name to appear on the 
ballot.255  Not only does the petition signature requirement constitute an 
infringement on equal protection rights in and of itself by making it difficult 
for third-party candidates to obtain a place on the ballot; other Maine laws 
enhance the difficulty by imposing requirements that are overly strict in their 
application.256 
Together with Maine’s petition requirement, the signature collection 
process has infringed the First Amendment rights of both Maine’s voters and 
its third-party candidates.257  The Court in Williams noted that the reasons for 
imposing excessive burdens on independent-party candidates by using early 
filing dates could not be upheld as promoting any legitimate interest of the 
state.258  In the Hoffman case, a major point of contention was whether the 
physical presence requirements had been met by Hoffman while he was 
collecting signatures for his general election run.259  These requirements 
constitute an undue burden on the abilities of third-party candidates to obtain 
enough signatures to receive a place on federal election ballots.260  What the 
Maine statute does is require candidates running for office to acquire a great 
number of petition signatures simply to be eligible to have their name placed 
on the ballot.261 Not only does the law require the collection of a large number 
of signatures, but it also requires that the signer of the petition do so while in 
 
 252. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(7)(A); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(9); 
Anderson, 460 U.S. at 783; Williams, 393 U.S. at 31; Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 434 
(1971); Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1060–61. 
 253. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 796–99. 
 254. See id.; Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 14–18; Smith, supra note 
111, at 174–77. 
 255. Kristin Sullivan, Requirements for Petitioning Candidates under Public Financing, 
available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2006/rpt/2006-R-0162.htm. 
 256. Id.; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(7)(A) (2007); Williams, 393 U.S. at 27. 
 257. Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 14–18; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
21-A, § 354(7)(A); Williams, 393 U.S. at 31–32. 
 258. Williams, 393 U.S. at 29. 
 259. Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 6; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 
354(7)(A). 
 260. Id.; Williams, 393 U.S. at 29. 
 261. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354. 
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the physical presence of the petition circulator.262  Therefore, the task of 
actually accumulating the required number of signatures becomes more 
difficult.263  The major political parties do not have to contend with this 
situation,264 and thus, a distinction is drawn between major-party candidates 
and third-party candidates.265 
Using the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Anderson, such a distinction 
violates the Fourteenth Amendment.266  The Court in that case noted that equal 
protection is violated where major-party candidates have different 
requirements than independent-party candidates.267  Under Maine law, 
however, not only are major candidates freed from having to collect signatures, 
but they are also free from the overly stringent “physical presence” 
requirements required under Maine state law.268  This requirement seems to be 
an additional qualification for independent candidates, which goes against the 
Court’s decision in Thornton.269 
The Anderson Court also reasoned that by not allowing a candidate a place 
on a ballot, the rights of the voter were also violated.270  The Court took notice 
of the fact that, by having only major-party candidates on an election ballot, 
there was a chance that some voters would be unable to select candidates who 
share their political ideology.271  As such, the balancing test of Anderson 
renders the decision of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court overturning the 
findings of the Secretary of State questionable.272  In considering the 
“character and magnitude” of the injury to a Maine voter’s First Amendment 
rights, it hardly seems appropriate that the rules requiring the physical presence 
of the petitioner ought to be upheld.273  What needs to be considered is whether 
 
 262. Id.; see also Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 6. 
 263. Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 6, 14–18; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
21-A, § 354 (2007). 
 264. Shannon Jones, Maine: SEP Campaign Faced Arcane Ballot Requirements, Private 
Property Restrictions, June 2, 2004, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2004/jun2004/mne2-j02.shtml 
(last visited Mar. 21, 2010). 
 265. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354; Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 799–801 
(1983); Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 6, 14–18. 
 266. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 783; see Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 6, 
14–18. 
 267. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 783, 786–88. 
 268. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354; Jones, supra note 264.  
 269. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354; Jones, supra note 264; see also Thornton, 514 
U.S. at 837–838.  
 270. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 786–88; see also Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974).  
 271. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 786–88. 
 272. Id. at 789; Knutson v. Dep’t of Sec’y of State and Herbert Hoffman, 2008 ME 124, ¶¶ 
16–21, 954 A.2d 1054, 1060–61; see also Daybell, supra note 161, at 310.  
 273. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(7) (2007); Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789. 
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these provisions of Maine election law serve any justifiable purpose, deserving 
of the serious burden imposed on voter’s rights.274 
Because the right to associate politically is of such importance, and 
because differing or controversial viewpoints are essential to the political 
process, what Maine law has done is render worthless the opinion of voters 
whose political views are different than those of the major-party candidates.275  
The Court in Anderson noted that the First Amendment is violated if 
independent candidates are burdened to a greater extent or in a manner 
inconsistent with major political parties regarding the right to properly 
associate.276  Those voters who legitimately signed Herbert Hoffman’s petition 
during the petition signing process have therefore been deprived of their 
rights.277  These were people who legally signed the petitions in accordance 
with the requirements under Maine law, and by depriving them of their rights 
in having their votes counted, they are effectively deprived of their First 
Amendment rights under the United States Constitution.278  Even more 
problematic in Hoffman was the fact that the Maine Supreme Judicial Court 
failed to pay adequate attention to the First Amendment concerns in the first 
place.279 
It was fully acknowledged during the Hoffman case hearings that 
signatures were taken outside of Hoffman’s presence as he circulated 
petitions.280  As an initial matter, the requirement that signatures be gathered in 
the presence of the circulator creates an undue burden on the candidate.281  The 
requirement creates a situation where a candidate is unable to have people 
collect signatures on their behalf while the candidate is engaged in other 
activity, and if the candidate is the individual who is circulating the petition, he 
or she is responsible for personally witnessing every signature placed on that 
petition.282 
 
 274. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(7); Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789; see also Nazzarine, 
supra note 182, at 319.  
 275. FREE EXPRESSION IN AMERICA, supra note 200, at 172–73; see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 21-A, § 354(7); see Knutson v. Dep’t of Sec’y of State and Herbert Hoffman (Knutson II), 
2008 ME 129, ¶ 7, No. Ken-08-375, 2008 WL 3855025 (Me.) at *2 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Aug. 20, 
2008).  
 276. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 793–94. 
 277. See Knutson II, 2008 ME 129, ¶ 7, No. Ken-08-375, 2008 WL 3855025 (Me.) at *2 
(Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Aug. 20, 2008).  
 278. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354 (2007). 
 279. Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 3. 
 280. Id. at 7–8. 
 281. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354 (2007); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 27–32 
(1968); Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 6, 14–18. 
 282. Williams, 393 U.S. at 27–32; Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 6, 14–
18; see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354. 
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This disadvantage became evident when Hoffman was ultimately denied a 
place on the general election ballot and was forced to attempt to win the Maine 
United States Senate seat through a write-in campaign.283  Appearing as a 
write-in candidate is not sufficient in remedying the violations incurred by 
Hoffman.284  Voters knew of Hoffman, and therefore voted for him in the 
general election, while aware that Hoffman had almost no chance of defeating 
incumbent Susan Collins.285  What people found when they finally looked at 
the Secretary of State’s website for the vote tally, however, was that many of 
the votes for Hoffman had not been counted.286  Individuals from a number of 
towns alleged that they had voted for Hoffman by writing his name in under 
the “other” category, though the end tally for a number of these towns counted 
zero votes for Hoffman.287  Of specific concern was the fact that no votes for 
Hoffman were counted in Franklin County, where a university is located.288  It 
should also be noted that Herbert Hoffman was not the only write-in candidate 
to appear on the ballot, meaning that municipalities that counted zero votes for 
candidates in the “other” category did not count votes for any of the other 
Senate candidates running as write-in contenders.289 
What towns like Limerick, Maine contended with was voter 
disenfranchisement through human error.290  Of the five votes cast for write-in 
candidates in that town, not one vote actually made it to the final tally.291  
Could one definitively say that this would not have happened if those 
candidates (presumably including Herbert Hoffman) had been allowed to have 
their name printed on the general ballot?  It is unlikely that any definitive 
conclusion can be reached.292  But it is hardly arguable that had Hoffman’s 
name actually appeared on the ballot, such errors would have been less likely 
to occur, and those voters actually voting for Hoffman would have had a better 
chance of having their votes counted.293 
One of the problems encountered in the town of Limerick was that the list 
of pre-notarized and affirmed candidates for the write-in campaign never made 
it to the town.294  As a result, any vote for a write-in candidate could not be 
 
 283. Bill Nemitz, Write-in Senate Votes Don’t Add Up, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Dec. 16, 
2008, at B1. 
 284. Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 12–13.   
 285. Bill Nemitz, Write-in Senate Votes Don’t Add Up, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Dec. 16, 
2008, at B1.   
 286. Id.   
 287. Id.   
 288. Id.   
 289. Id. 
 290. Nemitz, supra note 285. 
 291. Id.  
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counted in Limerick.295  Despite the fact that Secretary of State Matthew 
Dunlap has plans for avoiding such results in the future, this fails to remedy the 
effects of an election where a candidate was unable to garner votes in certain 
state municipalities.296 
CONCLUSION 
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in the Hoffman case sets 
dangerous precedent for election law.297 Should literal statutory interpretations 
continue to be upheld over the legitimate interests of independent party 
candidates asserting their constitutional rights, the result will be a two-party 
system where voters continue to suffer the effects of disenfranchisement.298 
Election law in Maine seeks to protect the interests of the state in ensuring 
that the nomination process is valid.299  While states have a legitimate interest 
in maintaining control and order over their election process, questions arise 
when laws hinder the interests of large groups of the voting population.300  In 
parts of Maine, it was clear that Hoffman’s exclusion from the ballot served to 
disenfranchise a number of people who attempted to vote for him.301  Voters 
who attempted to cast votes for Hoffman were otherwise unable to, as write-in 
votes in some towns were never actually counted.302 
The question must be posed: Are Maine’s election requirements justified 
under strict scrutiny in light of the fact that they have disenfranchised 
voters?303  The Maine Supreme Court failed to address the First Amendment 
issue, an issue that may have served to complicate the rather straightforward 
decision that the court seemed to reach.304  By looking at the language of the 
statute, it appears as though the decision of the court was fair.305  It appears 
that Hoffman took an improper oath because he was not present to witness 
 
 295. Nemitz, supra note 285. 
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HERALD, Dec. 16, 2008, at B1. 
 301. Nemitz, supra note 285. 
 302. Id.   
 303. Id.; see ME. REV.STAT. ANN tit. 21-A, § 354 (2007). 
 304. See Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 3; see also FARBER, supra note 
200, at 233–39. 
 305. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(7)(A) (2007); Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1062. 
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every signature put on his petition.306  But the issue is not about whether or not 
Hoffman was right or wrong in this case; it is about the state of the law and its 
potential to improperly deprive voters of their constitutional rights.307  The 
Maine Supreme Judicial Court looked only at the application of the law as it 
pertained to the immediate case at hand rather than the larger implications of 
its decision.308 
The Maine legislature must address the issue at hand and should begin to 
consider the intent of those individuals forced to acquire signatures to support 
their candidacy when they engage in the petition process.309  If the signature 
collection process is done in good faith, there seems to be little interest for the 
state in maintaining overly strict requirements for candidates, especially when 
considering more serious constitutional concerns.310  The law as it stands today 
serves as a technical barrier to candidates who might in good faith have tried to 
comply with the requirements of the law but for some reason failed to do so.311  
In light of First and Fourteenth Amendment concerns, technicalities in the 
Maine statutes cannot reasonably stand in the way of the ability to run for 
political office.312 
POSTSCRIPT 
On June 4, 2009, Governor Baldacci of Maine signed into law a bill 
designed to increase fairness among third-party candidates running for elected 
office in the State of Maine.313  In addition, the Maine legislature has taken 
action with respect to some details of its election law in order to clarify 
whether or not an entire petition should be thrown out for improperly collected 
 
 306. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(7)(A) (2007); see also Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 
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(noting that where the intent of the candidate is to commit fraud, the petitions will be invalidated, 
though fraud is not required for invalidation). 
 310. U.S. CONST. amend. I; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 434 
(1971); Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1061–62. 
 311. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(7)(A); Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1061–62 (where the 
Maine Supreme Court determined that it would use literal interpretations of the statute). 
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 313. Former Independent Candidate Helps Influence Maine Election Laws, Independent 
Political Report, June 17, 2009, http://www.independentpoliticalreport.com/2009/06/former-
independent-candidate-helps-influence-maine-election-laws/ (last visited Feb. 15 2010). 
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signatures on the petition.314  The law now states that should a signature on a 
petition be improperly collected, only those signatures, rather than the petition 
as a whole, will be eliminated.315  While this is certainly a step in the right 
direction, the law does not change the strict physical presence requirements for 
candidates. 316  In fact, the new law simply clarifies what is meant by “physical 
presence,” and petition circulators are still required to swear an oath that all 
signatures on a petition were “personally witnessed.”317  Therefore, while 
attempts are being made to ensure a fairer route for the election of third party 
candidates in Maine, there are still a number of challenges facing independent 
candidates today, and the Maine legislature should continue its active efforts to 
ensure that future changes are made to improve Maine’s election laws. 
DAVID W. MORIN 
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